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NIKHIL R. DEVANUR2 , Microsoft Research
S. MATTHEW WEINBERG3, Princeton University
We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with
hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distribution over bidder values and bud-
gets. The prior may be correlated across items and budgets of the same bidder, but is assumed independent
across bidders. We target mechanisms that are Bayesian Incentive Compatible, but that are ex-post Indi-
vidually Rational and ex-post budget respecting. Virtually no such mechanisms are known that satisfy all
these conditions and guarantee any revenue approximation, even with just a single item. We provide a com-
putationally efficient mechanism that is a 3-approximation with respect to all BIC, ex-post IR, and ex-post
budget respecting mechanisms. Note that the problem is NP-hard to approximate better than a factor of
16/15, even in the case where the prior is a point mass [Chakrabarty and Goel 2010]. We further character-
ize the optimal mechanism in this setting, showing that it can be interpreted as a distribution over virtual
welfare maximizers.
We prove our results by making use of a black-box reduction from mechanism to algorithm design de-
veloped by [Cai et al. 2013]. Our main technical contribution is a computationally efficient 3-approximation
algorithm for the algorithmic problem that results by an application of their framework to this problem.
The algorithmic problem has a mixed-sign objective and is NP-hard to optimize exactly, so it is surprising
that a computationally efficient approximation is possible at all. In the case of a single item (m = 1), the
algorithmic problem can be solved exactly via exhaustive search, leading to a computationally efficient ex-
act algorithm and a stronger characterization of the optimal mechanism as a distribution over virtual value
maximizers.
1. INTRODUCTION
Most of auction theory crucially depends on the assumption of quasi-linear utilities,
that the utility is equal to valuation minus payments. This assumption fails when
bidders are budget constrained.1 Auctions with budget constrained bidders are com-
monplace, and prominent examples of this are ad-auctions and auctions for govern-
ment licensing such as the FCC spectrum auction. An interesting example of budget
constraint occurs in the auction for professional cricket players in the Indian Premier
League: the league imposes a budget constraint on all the teams as a means of ensur-
ing well balanced teams. Another source of budget constraints is what Che and Gale
[1998] call the moral hazard problem: procurement is often delegated and budget con-
straints are imposed as a means of controlling the spend. A budget represents the
bidder’s ability to pay, in contrast to the valuation which represents his willingness
to pay. For this reason, budgets may be more tangible and easier to estimate than
1The terms financially constrained bidders or bidders with liquidity constraints are used synonymously.
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valuations. It is therefore important to understand how budget constraints impact
the design of auctions; this has been well established by now [Che and Gale 1998;
Pai and Vohra 2014; Benoit and Krishna 2001; Laffont and Robert 1996; Maskin 2000;
Malakhov and Vohra 2005; Che and Gale 2000; Bhattacharya et al. 2010].
The theory of auctions in the presence of budget constraints on bidders lags far
behind the theory of auctions without budgets. For instance, consider the design of
optimal (revenue maximizing) auctions that are Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC)
and ex-post individually rational (IR). While Myerson [1981] gives a beautiful theory
characterizing the optimal auction for any single parameter domain, no such charac-
terization is known in the presence of private budgets (that could be correlated with
the valuation). As a way to deal with this difficulty, previous papers have considered
special cases and auctions with a subset of the desired properties. (See Section 1.2 for
details.) We adopt the Computer Science approach of approximation, while incorporat-
ing all the desired properties. The main result of this paper is a 3-approximation to the
optimal auction in the class of auctions that are
— BIC,
— ex-post IR and
— ex-post budget respecting, with private budgets that could be correlated with the
valuations,
for multiple heterogenous items and additive valuations. This is the first constant fac-
tor approximation for this class of auctions. Moreover, the computational problem, even
without any incentive constraints is already NP-Hard to approximate within a ratio of
16/15 [Chakrabarty and Goel 2010]. This too suggests that an approximation is neces-
sary.
1.1. Overview of Techniques
We prove our main result by making use of an algorithmic framework developed
in [Cai et al. 2013]. The computational aspect of their framework provides a black-
box reduction from a wide class of Bayesian mechanism design problems to problems
of purely algorithm design. More specifically, they show that any α-approximation al-
gorithm for a certain incentive-free algorithmic problem (induced by the mechanism
design problem at hand) can be leveraged to find a BIC, IR mechanism that is also an
α-approximation (to the optimal BIC, IR mechanism) in polynomial time. Significant
further details on their reduction and how to employ it can be found in Section 2.1.
After applying their framework to our problem, there is still the issue of solving the
algorithmic problem that pops out of the reduction. This turns out to be essentially a
(virtual) welfare maximization problem (without budgets), but where bidder types are
somewhat involved. The optimization involves a mixed sign objective (i.e. the objec-
tive is a sum of several terms which can be positive or negative). Such optimization
problems are typically solvable exactly in polynomial time or computationally hard to
approximate within any finite factor, but rarely in between (due to the mixed signs in
the objective). Interestingly, we obtain a 3-approximation for our mixed-sign objective
problem despite the fact that it is NP-hard to optimize exactly. The design and analysis
of our algorithm can be found in Section 3.
Cai et. al.’s framework also contains a structural result. We use it to show that
the optimal auction in our setting is a distribution over virtual welfare maximizers.
By this, we mean that the optimal mechanism maintains a distribution over n map-
pings, one mapping per bidder that maps types to virtual types, and, given a vector
of reported types, it samples n mappings from this distribution, uses them to map the
reported types to virtual types, and proceeds to choose an allocation that optimizes vir-
tual welfare. Note that by virtual types in the previous sentence we do not mean the
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specific virtual types as computed by Myerson’s virtual transformation, which aren’t
even defined for multi-dimensional types, but just some virtual types that may or may
not be the same as the true types. In particular, each mapping in the support of the
mechanism’s distribution will take as input a type (which is an additive function with
non-negative item values plus a non-negative budget), and output a virtual type with-
out a budget constraint and whose valuation function is the sum of a budgeted-additive
function2 with non-negative item values (which depends on the input type in a very
structured way) plus an additive function with possibly negative item values (which
may be unstructured with respect to the input type). We provide a formal statement
of this structural claim in Section 3 as well. Note that for the special case of a single
item auction, this gives a particularly simple structure: the virtual types are now just
a single (possibly negative) real number, which could be interpreted as a virtual value.
The optimal auction simply maps reported types to virtual values and assigns the item
to the bidder with the highest virtual value.
1.2. Related Work
The result that comes closest to characterizing the optimal auction is that of
Pai and Vohra [2014]: they characterize the optimal budget respecting BIC auction
for a single item. Their auction is implemented as an all-pay auction and is therefore
not ex-post IR. They show that the optimal BIC, interim IR mechanism that respects
budgets ex-post takes on a form similar to Myerson’s, but with additional pooling to
enforce that no bidder is asked to pay more than her budget, while also maintaining
that no bidder has incentive to underreport their budget. Earlier, Laffont and Robert
[1996] and Maskin [2000] considered the case where valuations are private informa-
tion but budgets are common knowledge and identical. Malakhov and Vohra [2005]
study the setting where there are two bidders, one has a known budget constraint
while the other does not. Che and Gale [2000] characterize the optimal pricing scheme
for a single item with a single bidder, with private valuation and budget that could be
correlated with each other. The limited special cases considered by these papers point
to the difficulty of characterizing the optimal auction, which motivates the search for
efficient approximations.
Another line of work ranks different auction formats by the revenue generated in
the presence of budgets. Che and Gale [1998] compare first price, second price and all-
pay auctions, while Benoit and Krishna [2001] compare sequential and simultaneous
auctions.
In the computer science tradition, [Bhattacharya et al. 2010] give a 4-approximation
for multiple items with additive valuations, but they assume that the budgets are
publicly known, and the auction is not ex-post IR. Chawla et al. [2011] give a 2-
approximation in a single parameter domain, but assume that the budgets are pub-
lic. They also consider private budgets, where budgets and values are independently
distributed, in single parameter matroid domains, and MHR Distributions, and give a
3(1 + e)-approximation. Finally, Cai et al. [2012], provide exactly optimal mechanisms
for multiple items, additive valuations and private budgets, but their auctions are
interim-IR. Once again, all these auctions make additional assumptions when com-
pared to us.
Cai et al. [2013] give a general reduction from mechanism design to algorithm de-
sign, which we use for our results. For the special case of a single item auction with
private budgets, we show that the algorithmic problem obtained through this reduc-
2A function v(·) is budgeted-additive if there exists a b such that v(S) = min{b,
∑
i∈S v({i})} for all S. Note
that this is different from an additive buyer with a budget, and that a budgeted-additive buyer indeed has
quasi-linear utilities.
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tion is quite easy to solve optimally, resulting in exactly optimal single-item auctions
with budgets. However, when there are multiple items the resulting algorithmic prob-
lem becomes NP-Hard [Chakrabarty and Goel 2010]. We give a 3-approximation to
this algorithmic problem which through the reduction gives a 3-approximately opti-
mal multi-item auction with budgets. Recently, [Bhalgat et al. 2013] showed that (a
weaker form of) the reduction of Cai et al. [2013] could be obtained using the simpler
multiplicative weight update method instead of the ellipsoid algorithm used originally,
and consider the variant of our setting where the items are divisible. The algorithmic
problem in this case is once again easy. Daskalakis and Weinberg [2015] also use the
reduction in [Cai et al. 2013] to design an auction for a non-linear objective, namely
the makespan of an assigment of jobs to machines.
The auction design problem has also been considered in a worst-case model, as op-
posed to a Bayesian model. A standard framework is that of competitive auctions,
where a bound is shown on the ratio of the revenue of an optimal auction to the rev-
enue of the given auction on any instantiation of valuations and budgets. Borgs et al.
[2005] and Abrams [2006] give constant competitive auctions for multi-unit auctions,
under an assumption of bidder dominance, that the contribution of a single bidder to
the total revenue is sufficiently small. [Devanur et al. 2013] give constant competitive
auctions for single parameter downward-closed domains with a public, common budget
constraint. Since the worst-case setting is decidedly more difficult than the Bayesian
setting, these results are not comparable to ours. Another line of work considers the
design of Pareto-optimal auctions: Dobzinski et al. [2008] characterize single item auc-
tions that are Pareto-optimal, with public budgets and show an impossibility of a simi-
lar auction for private budgets. Goel et al. [2012] extend this auction to a more general
poly-matroidal setting.
1.3. Conclusions and Future Work
The goals of revenue-optimality, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post budget fea-
sibility seem to be at odds with one another. This is highlighted by the fact that, prior
to our work, no known auctions even approximately satisfied all three conditions, even
with just a single item and private budgets that are independent of values. We provide
a computationally efficient 3-approximation for the significantly more general case of
auctions for multiple heterogeneous goods and additive bidders with private budgets
that can be correlated with their values. While this model is already quite general com-
pared to the previous state-of-the-art, it is an important direction to see if our results
can be extended to more complex classes of bidder valuations, or to more complex con-
straints on feasible allocations. In particular, well studied classes of valuations such
as gross substitutes would be interesting next steps.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We begin with formal definitions of the mechanism design problem we study. We then
outline the reduction of Cai et al. [2013] (Section 2.1) and its implications (Section
2.2) for our problem. Finally we state a related problem (Section 2.3), the Generalized
Assignment Problem, which we use in the design of our algorithm.
Bidders. There are n bidders, each with additive valuations overm items and a hard
budget constraint. Specifically, bidder i has value vij for item j, value
∑
j∈S vij for set
S, and hard budget bi. We denote by ~vi the vector of bidder i’s values for all m items.
We denote by Di the joint distribution of (~vi, bi). We denote by D = ×iDi the joint
distribution of all bidders’ valuations and budgets.
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Mechanisms. Our goal is to design Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) mecha-
nisms that are ex-post Individually Rational (IR) and that respect budgets ex-post.
Formally, for a (randomized) mechanismM , we can denote by xMij (~v,
~b, r) to be 1 if bid-
der i receives item j when the profile of values/budgets reported to M is (~v,~b) and
the random seed used by M is r, or 0 otherwise. Similarly, we denote by qMi (~v,
~b, r)
to be the price paid by bidder i in the same conditions. We can then define the in-
terim allocation probability πMij (~vi, bi) to be the probability that bidder i receives item
j when reporting (~vi, bi) over the randomness of other agent’s (valuation,budget)s
(~v−i,~b−i) being drawn from D−i, and any randomness in M . We can similarly de-
fine the interim price pMi (~vi, bi) to be the expected payment made by bidder i over
the same randomness. Formally, πMij (~vi, bi) = E(~v−i,~b−i)←D−i,r[x
M
ij (~vi;~v−i, bi;
~b−i, r)] and
pMij (~vi, bi) = E(~v−i,~b−i)←D−i,r[q
M
ij (~vi;~v−i, bi;
~b−i, r)]. Formal definitions of BIC, IR, and ex-
post budgets are below.
Definition 2.1. (Bayesian Incentive Compatible) A mechanism M is BIC if for all
bidders i, and types (~vi, bi), (~v
′
i, b
′
i) the following holds:
~vi · ~π
M
i (~vi, bi)− p
M
i (~vi, bi) ≥ ~vi · ~π
M
i (~v
′
i, b
′
i)− p
M
i (~v
′
i, b
′
i).
A mechanism is said to be ǫ-BIC if for all bidders i, and types (~vi, bi), (~v
′
i, b
′
i) the follow-
ing holds:
~vi · ~π
M
i (~vi, bi)− p
M
i (~vi, bi) ≥ ~vi · ~π
M
i (~v
′
i, b
′
i)− p
M
i (~v
′
i, b
′
i)− ǫ.
Definition 2.2. (Interim/Ex-Post Individually Rational) A mechanism M is interim
IR if for all bidders i, and types (~vi, bi) the following holds:
~vi · ~π
M
i (~vi, bi) ≥ p
M
i (~vi, bi).
Further, it is ex-post IR if for all bidders i, all profiles (~v,~b) and random seeds r, we
have:
~vi · ~x
M
i (~v,
~b, r) ≥ qMi (~v,
~b, r).
Definition 2.3. (Ex-Post Budget Respecting) A mechanism M respects budgets ex-
post if for all type profiles (~v,~b), all random seeds r, and all bidders i we have:
qMi (~v,
~b, r) ≤ bi.
Definition 2.4. (No Positive Transfers) A mechanismM has no positive transfers if
for all type profiles (~v,~b), all random seeds r, and all bidders i we have:
qMi (~v,
~b, r) ≥ 0.
2.1. Reduction from Mechanism to Algorithm Design
In recent work, [Cai et al. 2013] provide an algorithmic framework for mechanism de-
sign, showing how to design mechanisms by solving purely algorithmic problems. We
use this reduction to reduce our mechanism design problem to an algorithm design
problem and show a 3-approximation to this algorithmic problem. In the rest of this
section, we state the general formulations of the mechanism design and the corre-
sponding algorithm design problems considered by Cai et al. [2013]. Then we give the
precise statement of their reduction, and a structural characterization of the optimal
mechanism obtained as a byproduct of their reduction. Finally we instantiate these to
state the corresponding problems in our setting, and massage the resulting problems
to simplify them.
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[Cai et al. 2013] call the mechanism design problems of study BMeD(F ,V ,O),3
where feasibility constraints F , possible valuations V , and optimization objective O
parameterize the problem. Formally, this problem is defined as:
BMeD(F ,V ,O):
INPUT: For each bidder i ∈ [n], a finite set Ti ⊆ V , and a distribution Di over Ti,
presented by explicitly listing all types in Ti and their corresponding probability.
OUTPUT: A feasible (selects an allocation in F with probability 1), BIC, (interim) IR
mechanism for bidders drawn from D = ×iDi.
GOAL: Find the mechanism that optimizes O in expectation, with respect to all BIC,
IR mechanisms (when bidders with types drawn from D play truthfully).
APPROXIMATION: An algorithm is said to be an (ǫ, α)-approximation if it finds an
ǫ-BIC mechanism whose expected value of O (when bidders drawn from D report
truthfully) is at least α ·OPT− ǫ.
In our problem, the feasible allocations are those that award each item to at most one
bidder. So we could denote the set of feasible allocations as [m+1]n (with the convention
that selecting the allocation ~a awards item j to bidder aj if aj > 0, or no one if aj = 0).
The possible bidder types are all additive functions over items (with non-negative mul-
tipliers), and non-negative budgets, which we could denote by Rm+1+ . Our objective is
revenue. To ensure that all feasible mechanisms are ex-post IR (note that their reduc-
tion only guarantees interim IR without extra work) and ex-post budget respecting,
we will define the objective function REVENUE as follows. REVENUE takes as input a
valuation profile (~v,~b), an allocation ~x (where xij = 1 iff bidder i is awarded item j),
and a price vector ~p. We define REVENUE(~v,~b, ~x, ~p) =
∑
i pi, if 0 ≤ pi ≤ min{bi, ~vi · ~xi}
for all i, or REVENUE(~v,~b, ~x, ~p) = −∞ otherwise.
There is a subtle issue with respect to why we want to design mechanisms that
respect budgets ex-post. Specifically, is it just because the designer wishes to offer
this guarantee to the bidders, who have true quasi-linear preferences? If so, then
this is exactly the setting we have described so far: the designer is constrained to
select a mechanism that respects budgets ex-post, but bidders will still choose how to
play as if they were quasi-linear. While this motivation is certainly mathematically
interesting, it is also non-standard and perhaps unrealistic. Instead, the more com-
mon motivation is because bidders physically can’t pay more than their budget, and
would have utility −∞ if asked to do so. In this case, the designer should actively
exploit this to extract higher revenue. For example, if for all i, bidder i is awarded
all the items and charged her budget with tiny probability ǫ/n, then the designer
needn’t worry about bidders overreporting their budget (as otherwise they’d get util-
ity −∞ with probability ǫ/n). Therefore, a mechanism can be made BIC in the lat-
ter case (while losing arbitrarily little revenue) iff for all (~vi, bi), (~v
′
i, b
′
i) with b
′
i ≤ bi,
~vi ·~π
M
i (~vi, bi)−p
M
i (~vi, bi) ≥ ~vi ·~π
M
i (~v
′
i, b
′
i)−p
M
i (~v
′
i, b
′
i).Note that this is a relaxed condition
of the former setting, which requires the inequality to hold for all bi, b
′
i. Fortunately,
the Cai et. al. framework applies in both settings, and the resulting structure and al-
gorithmic problem are exactly the same. So all of our theorems, exactly as stated, hold
in both of the described settings.
Informally, the main result of [Cai et al. 2013] states that, for all F ,V ,O, the
problem BMeD(F ,V ,O) can be solved in polynomial time with black-box access to a
poly-time algorithm for a purely algorithmic problem that they call GOOP(F ,V ,O).4
3BMeD stands for Bayesian Mechanism Design.
4GOOP stands for Generalized Objective Optimization Problem.
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Below, V× denotes the closure of V under addition and (possibly negative) scalar
multiplications (so for instance, (Rm+ )
× = Rm).
GOOP(F ,V ,O):
INPUT: A type ti ∈ V , multiplier mi ∈ R, and virtual valuation function gi ∈ V
× for
each i ∈ [n].5
OUTPUT: An allocation x ∈ F and price vector ~p ∈ Rn+.
GOAL: Find argmaxx∈F ,~p{O(~t, x, ~p) +
∑
imipi +
∑
i gi(x)}.
APPROXIMATION: (x∗, ~p∗) is said to be an α-approximation if O(~t, x∗, ~p∗) +
∑
imip
∗
i +∑
i gi(x
∗) ≥ α · argmaxx∈F ,~p{O(~t, x, ~p) +
∑
imipi +
∑
i gi(x)}.
Further below we provide much more detail on the structure of the algorithmic focus
of this paper, GOOP([n + 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE), but we first conclude our discussion
of the reduction we employ. The main result of [Cai et al. 2013] states that for all
ǫ > 0, an (ǫ, α)-approximation for BMeD(F ,V ,O) can be obtained from a poly-time α-
approximation for GOOP(F ,V ,O). The additive error (and failure probability in the
theorem statement) is due to a sampling procedure in the execution of the reduction.
We provide a full statement of their main result below.6
THEOREM 2.5. (Theorem 4 of [Cai et al. 2013]) For all F ,V ,O, and ǫ > 0, if there
is a poly-time α-approximation algorithm, G, for GOOP(F ,V ,O), there is a poly-time
(ǫ, α)-approximation algorithm for BMeD(F ,V ,O) as well. Specifically, if ℓ denotes the
input length of a BMeD(F ,V ,O) instance, the algorithm runs in time poly(ℓ, 1/ǫ), makes
poly(ℓ, 1/ǫ) black box calls to G on inputs of size poly(ℓ, 1/ǫ), and succeeds with proba-
bility 1− exp(−poly(ℓ, 1/ǫ)).
[Cai et al. 2013] prove Theorem 2.5 above by considering a linear program that op-
timizes over the space of interim forms that are both truthful (that satisfy the linear
constraints in Definitions 2.1 and 2.2), and feasible (those that correspond to an actual
mechanism that selects an outcome x ∈ F on every profile with probability 1).7 Linear
constraints enforcing that an interim form is BIC and interim IR can be written explic-
itly, but a computationally efficient separation oracle for the space of feasible interim
forms is still required in order to solve the linear program. They show how to obtain
such a separation oracle with black-box access to an algorithm that solves GOOP, and
that this entire process preserves approximation as well.
[Cai et al. 2013] further provide a structural characterization of the space of all feasi-
ble mechanisms (truthful or not), leading to a structured implementation of whatever
interim form is output by the LP. Specifically, they show that the extreme points of
the space of feasible interim forms correspond to mechanisms that associate a virtual
valuation function gi(ti)(·) and price multiplier mi(ti) to each type ti ∈ Ti, and then
selects on profile (t1, . . . , tn) the allocation and price vector that solves GOOP on in-
put t1, . . . , tn, m1(t1), . . . ,mn(tn),
∑
i gi(ti)(·). They show further that solving the linear
program explicitly finds a list of virtual valuation functions and multipliers whose re-
sulting interim forms contain the optimal (truthful) interim form in their convex hull.
Theorem 2.6 below captures the structural aspect of their result.
5For other applications, the inputs gi(·) are sometimes called instead cost functions.
6The theorem statement is identical in content, but reworded for clarity and cleanliness.
7In fact, they need to work with a generalization of interim forms, called implicit forms, to accommodate
non-additive valuations. But we describe their proof for additive valuations for clarity of exposition, and
because it is relevant for our setting.
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THEOREM 2.6. (Implicit in [Cai et al. 2013]) For all BMeD instances, the optimal
mechanism can be implemented as a distribution over generalized objective optimiz-
ers. Specifically, there exists a distribution ∆ over mappings (f δ1 , . . . , f
δ
n). Each map-
ping f δi takes types ti in Ti to price multipliers m
δ
i (ti) ∈ R and virtual valuation func-
tions gδi (ti)(·) ∈ V
×. The optimal mechanism first samples (f δ1 , . . . , f
δ
n) from ∆, and on
profile ~t, selects the outcome and price vector argmaxx∈F ,~p{O(~t, x, ~p) +
∑
im
δ
i (ti) · pi +∑
i g
δ
i (ti)(x)}.
In the section below, we provide further details surrounding instantiations of Theo-
rems 2.5 and 2.6 as they pertain to the problem at hand.
2.2. Instantiations
The goal of this section is to provide more details of the instantiation of The-
orems 2.5 and 2.6 to our setting, but not to provide proofs (for which we re-
fer the reader to [Cai et al. 2013]). We begin by describing the linear program
that the reduction of [Cai et al. 2013] would try to solve for our setting. Below,
F ([n + 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE) denotes the space of interim forms of all feasible (not
necessarily truthful) mechanisms. Specifically, (O,~π, ~p) ∈ F ([n+1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE)
if and only if there is a mechanism M that awards each item at most once on every
profile, is ex-post IR and ex-post budget respecting, awards bidder i item j when she
reports type ti with probability exactly πij(ti) (w.r.t. all other bidders’ types and the
randomness in the mechanism) and chargers bidder i price pi(ti) in expectation (over
all other bidders’ types and the randomness in the mechanism), and whose expected
revenue is exactly O. With this definition in mind, the linear program they solve is
stated below.
Variables:
— O, denoting the expected revenue of the interim form found.
— πij(ti) for all bidders i, items j, types ti, denoting the probability that bidder i re-
ceives item j when reporting type ti.
— pi(ti) for all bidders i and types ti, denoting the expected price paid by bidder iwhen
reporting type ti.
Constraints:
(1)
∑
j πij(ti) ·vij(ti)−pi(ti) ≥
∑
j πij(t
′
i) ·vij(ti)−pi(t
′
i), for all bidders i and types ti, t
′
i,
guaranteeing that the interim form corresponds to a BIC mechanism.
(2)
∑
j πij(ti) · vij(ti) − pi(ti) ≥ 0, for all bidders i and types ti, guaranteeing that the
interim form corresponds to an interim IR mechanism.8
(3) (O,~π, ~p) ∈ F ([n+ 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE), guaranteeing that the interim form corre-
sponds to a feasible mechanism.
Maximizing:
— O, the expected revenue.
The solution to this LP is the interim form of the optimal mechanism. The LP can
be solved in polynomial time, so long as we have a poly-time separation oracle for the
space F ([n + 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE). [Cai et al. 2013] shows that this can be obtained
8Actually, this constraint is redundant as we will also enforce that the mechanism be ex-post IR to be
considered feasible.
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via an algorithm for the related GOOP problem, which we instantiate in our setting
below.
Budgeted-Additive Virtual Welfare Maximization. As discussed above, in order to
find (approximately) optimal mechanisms for our setting, we need to study the purely
algorithmic problem GOOP([n+ 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE), which we pose formally below.
GOOP([n+ 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE):
INPUT: Values vij ≥ 0 and virtual values wij ∈ R for all i, j. Budget bi ∈ R+ and price
multiplier mi ∈ R for all i.
OUTPUT: An allocation ~x ∈ {0, 1}mn and prices ~p such that
∑
i xij ≤ 1 for all j (each
item awarded at most once),
∑
j xijvij ≥ pi (ex-post IR), pi ≤ bi (ex-post budget
respecting), and pi ≥ 0 (no positive transfers).
GOAL: Find argmax~x,~p{
∑
i(mi+1)pi+
∑
ij xijwij} (virtual revenue plus virtual welfare).
Note that in the above formulation, we have folded cases where REVENUE eval-
uates to −∞ into feasibility constraints on the output. We make two quick further
observations about the structure of GOOP([n + 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE), and call the
reformulation Budgeted-Additive Virtual Welfare Maximization (BAVWM). Also, for
cleanliness, we will replace the input price multipliers mi by mi − 1 so that the term
in the objective will be
∑
imipi. This is w.l.o.g. as each mi could be any real number.
OBSERVATION 1. Ifmi > 0, the optimal choice for pi is alwaysmin{bi,
∑
j xijvij}. If
mi ≤ 0, the best choice for pi is 0.
OBSERVATION 2. For all possible solutions (~x, ~p), the quality of (~x, ~p) for the input
instance (~v, ~w,~b, ~m) is the same as for the instance (~v′, ~w,~b, ~m) where v′ij = min{vij , bi},
for all i, j.
In light of these, we may set all negative mi to 0, and all vij to min{vij , bi} without
changing the problem, leading to the following reformulation.
Budgeted-Additive Virtual Welfare Maximization:
INPUT: Budget bi for all agents. Values vij ∈ [0, bi] for all agents and items. Price
multiplier mi ≥ 0 for all agents, and virtual value wij ∈ R for all agents and items.
OUTPUT: An allocation ~x ∈ {0, 1}mn such that
∑
i xij ≤ 1 for all j (each item awarded
at most once).
GOAL: Find argmax~x{
∑
i(mimin{bi,
∑
j xijvij}+
∑
j xijwij)}.
Note that in the above formulation, we no longer need to optimize over the price
vector, due to Observation 1. The problem can now be interpreted as just a welfare
maximization problem, where bidder i’s valuation function is the sum of a budgeted-
additive function (with non-negative item values) and an additive function (with pos-
sibly negative item values). Also, note that we can re-formulate the above problem to
remove the multipliers (mi)i from the input and the objective, by incorporating them in
the bi’s and the vij ’s. We choose to leave them in so that it is more transparent how the
inputs to BAVWM are related to the types reported by the bidders of the mechanism
output by the Cai et al. [2013] reduction.
2.3. The Generalized Assignment Problem
Our main technical result will make use of a rounding algorithm for the Generalized
Assignment Problem. We give here a statement of the problem and a rounding theorem
due to Shmoys and Tardos [Shmoys and Tardos 1993].
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:10
Generalized Assignment Problem:
INPUT: Processing times pij ∈ R+ and costs cij ∈ R for all machines i and jobs j,
capacities Ti for all machines i.
9
OUTPUT: An allocation ~x ∈ {0, 1}mn of jobs to machines such that
∑
i xij = 1 for all j
(each job is assigned) and
∑
j xijpij ≤ Ti (each machine processes at most its capacity).
GOAL: Find argmax~x{
∑
i,j xijcij} (total cost).
10
Now, we provide an LP due to Shmoys and Tardos that outputs a fractional solution
at least as good as OPT.
Variables:
— xij , for all machines i and jobs j, denoting the fraction of job j assigned to machine
i.
Constraints:
(1)
∑
i xij = 1, for all j, guaranteeing that every job is processed exactly once.
(2)
∑
j xij ≤ Ti, for all i, guaranteeing that no machine’s capacity is violated.
(3) xij = 0 if pij > Ti.
Maximizing:
—
∑
i,j xijcij , the total cost.
THEOREM 2.7. ([Shmoys and Tardos 1993]) The optimal fractional solution to the
above LP can be rounded in polynomial time to an integral solution such that:
(1)
∑
i xij = 1, for all j.
(2)
∑
j xij ≤ 2Ti, for all i.
(3)
∑
j xijcij ≥ OPT.
3. MAIN RESULTS
In Section 3.1 below, we provide our main computational result: a poly-time approxi-
mation algorithm for BAVWM, which implies a poly-time truthful mechanism for rev-
enue maximization that respects ex-post IR and ex-post budget constraints. In Sec-
tion 3.2, we detail the structure of the optimal mechanism in this setting, as well as
our computationally efficient mechanism from Section 3.1.
3.1. Computational Results
In this section, we provide a poly-time 3-approximation for BAVWM. We begin by
writing a LP relaxation, allowing the designer to award fractions of items as long as
the total fraction awarded doesn’t exceed 1. We split the fraction of item j awarded to
bidder i into two parts, x¯ij and xˆij . Let x¯ij denote the fraction of item j assigned to
agent i before exceeding bi. And let xˆij denote the fraction of item j assigned after. In
other words, if xij is the fraction of item j assigned to agent i, we have x¯ij + xˆij = xij ,∑
j x¯ijvij ≤ bi, and
∑
j x¯ijvij = bi if for any j, xˆij > 0. The idea is that assigning more
of item j to agent i before exceeding his budget increases both terms in the “goal”
above, but assigning more after exceeding the budget only affects the second term.
9Traditionally, some consider only costs cij ∈ R+, but the result we cite applies for negative costs as well.
10Traditionally, it makes sense to minimize total cost. As costs are possibly negative, the use of max or min
is irrelevant.
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The LP relaxation is as follows:
Variables:
— x¯ij , for all agents i and items j, denoting the fraction of item j assigned to agent i
contributing to both the budgeted-additive and additive terms in bidder i’s (virtual)
welfare.
— xˆij , for all agents i and items j, denoting the fraction of item j assigned to agent i
contributing to just the additive term in bidder i’s (virtual) welfare.
Constraints:
(1)
∑
i(x¯ij + xˆij) ≤ 1, for all j, guaranteeing that no item is allocated more than once.
(2)
∑
j x¯ijvij ≤ bi, for all i, guaranteeing that contributions to the budgeted-additive
term are not overcounted.
Maximizing:
—
∑
ij mix¯ijvij +
∑
ij wij(x¯ij + xˆij), the virtual welfare. Note that as each mi ≥ 0 and
vij ≥ 0, the optimal solution will never have xˆij > 0 unless
∑
j x¯ij = bi.
It is clear that any solution to BAVWM has a corresponding fractional solution to
this LP. So the goal is to solve this LP and round the fractional solution to an integral
one without too much loss. The idea is that the feasible region now looks pretty similar
to that of the generalized assignment problem, asking for an assignment of jobs to
machines such that the capacity of machine i is at most bi. We first prove the following
rounding theorem, which is a near-direct application of Theorem 2.7.
THEOREM 3.1. The optimal fractional solution to the above LP can be rounded in
polynomial time to an integral assignment such that:
(1)
∑
i(x¯ij + xˆij) ≤ 1 for all j.
(2)
∑
j x¯ijvij ≤ 2bi for all i.
(3)
∑
ij mix¯ijvij +
∑
ij wij(x¯ij + xˆij) ≥ OPT , where OPT is the value of the LP.
PROOF. We show how to interpret our LP as an instantiation of a fractional LP for
the generalized assignment problem, and then directly apply Theorem 2.7. We use pij
to denote processing times, cij to denote costs, and Ti to denote capacities in the created
generalized assignment problem instance.
— Machines:
(1) A dummy machine, 0.
(2) For all bidders i, a hat machine iˆ (corresponding to the hat variables in our LP).
(3) For all bidders i, a bar machine i¯ (corresponding to the bar variables in our LP).
— Jobs: A job j for all items j.
— Processing times and costs:
(1) p0j = c0j = 0 for all j. T0 = 0.
(2) pˆij = 0 for all j. cˆij = wij for all j. Tˆi = 0.
(3) p¯ij = vij . c¯ij = mivij + wij . T¯i = bi.
The fractional LP referenced in Theorem 2.7 on this instance would then be (note
that the capacity constraints for machines 0 and all iˆ are vacuously satisfied, and that
there do not exist any i, j for which pij > Ti by Observation 2):
Variables:
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— x0j , for all jobs j, denoting the fraction of job j assigned to machine 0.
— x¯ij , for all machines i and jobs j, denoting the fraction of job j assigned to machine
i¯.
— xˆij , for all machines i and jobs j, denoting the fraction of job j assigned to machine
iˆ.
Constraints:
(1) x0j +
∑
i(x¯ij + xˆij) = 1, for all j, guaranteeing that every job is allocated exactly
once.
(2)
∑
j x¯ijvij ≤ bi, for all i, guaranteeing that the total processing time on machine i¯ is
at most bi.
Maximizing:
—
∑
ij mix¯ijvij +
∑
ij wij(x¯ij + xˆij), the cost.
It’s clear that this LP is exactly the same as our LP, just with an additional dummy
bidder 0 who collects all unallocated fractions of items. By Theorem 2.7, the optimal
fractional solution to this LP can be rounded in polynomial time to an integral solution
whose total cost is at least as large, but where the capacity of machine i¯ could be as
large as 2bi, which is exactly an integral allocation of items to bidders with the desired
properties.
After applying Theorem 3.1, we now have an integral solution that is at least as good
as the optimum, except our solution is infeasible. It’s infeasible because it’s “getting
credit” for (virtual) welfare in the budgeted-additive term that is perhaps up to twice
the budget (i.e. up to 2bi). An “obvious” fix to this problemmight be to take this integral
solution and only take credit for budgeted-additive values up to bi, thereby making
the solution feasible again. Unfortunately, because the objective is mixed sign, the
resulting solution doesn’t provide any approximation guarantee.11 Instead, we provide
a simple procedure to select a feasible suballocation of this infeasible one that loses a
factor of 3.
THEOREM 3.2. Given an integral allocation ~x satisfying
∑
i x¯ij + xˆij ≤ 1 for all
j,
∑
j x¯ijvij ≤ 2bi for all i, and
∑
ij mix¯ijvij +
∑
ij wij(x¯ij + xˆij) = C, one can find in
poly-time an integral allocation ~y such that:
(1)
∑
i(y¯ij + yˆij) ≤ 1 for all j.
(2)
∑
j y¯ijvij ≤ bi for all i.
(3)
∑
ij miy¯ijvij +
∑
ij wij(y¯ij + yˆij) ≥ C/3.
PROOF. For each i, we wish to partition the set of items assigned to i via x¯ij (of the
infeasible integral solution), S, into three disjoint sets S1i , S
2
i , S
3
i such that
∑
j∈Sk
i
vij ≤
bi for all k. This is always possible: consider sorting the elements in decreasing order
of vij and greedily adding them one at a time to the S
k
i with minimal weight so far.
Assume for contradiction that some item j∗, when added, pushes some Ski from below
bi to above bi. Then without j
∗, each of S1i , S
2
i , S
3
i must have had weight strictly larger
than bi−vij∗ . As the total weight in all three (without j
∗) is at most 2bi−vij∗ , this means
11Consider, for example, the following instance: there is one buyer and two items. v11 = v12 = 3, b1 = 3,
w11 = w12 = −2. Then the allocation that awards both items and “gets credit” for up to 2bi is believed
to have virtual welfare 2. However, the correctly computed virtual welfare of this allocation is actually −1,
which clearly provides no meaningful approximation. Instead we must develop a procedure that, on this
instance, would allocate just one of the items.
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that 2bi − vij∗ > 3(bi − vij∗ )⇒ vij∗ > bi/2. But as we processed elements in decreasing
order of vij , this would imply that j
∗ was the third (or earlier) item processed, meaning
that some set must have been empty, and j∗ couldn’t have possibly pushed it over the
limit (as vij ≤ bi for all j). Therefore, at termination we must have
∑
j∈Sk
i
vij ≤ bi for
all k. Now, define k∗ = argmaxk{
∑
j∈Sk
i
mivij+wij}. Let y¯ij = 1 iff j ∈ S
k∗
i , and yˆij = xˆij
for all j.
It’s clear that
∑
j y¯ijvij ≤ bi for all i. As y¯ij ≤ x¯ij for all i, j, it’s also clear that∑
i y¯ij + yˆij ≤ 1 for all j. Finally, by choice of k
∗ it’s also clear that
∑
ij(mivij +wij)y¯ij ≥∑
ij(mivij + wij)x¯ij/3, and therefore
∑
ij miy¯ijvij +
∑
ij wij(y¯ij + yˆij) ≥ C/3, as de-
sired.
Combining Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 yields a feasible, integral allocation that is a 3-
approximation by rounding the fractional solution output by our LP, and it is easy to
see that the entire procedure runs in polynomial time.
THEOREM 3.3. There is a poly-time 3-approximation algorithm for Budgeted-
Additive Virtual Welfare Maximization, which is a reformulation of GOOP([n +
1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE). Therefore, for all ǫ > 0, there is a poly-time (ǫ, 3)-approximation
algorithm for BMeD([n + 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE). Specifically, if ℓ is the input length
to an instance of BMeD([n + 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE), the algorithm terminates in time
poly(ℓ, 1/ǫ) and succeeds with probability 1− exp(−poly(ℓ, 1/ǫ)).
We conclude this section with a remark about the special case of a single (or small
constant) number of items. Notice that BAVWM can be solved exactly by exhaustive
search in time poly(nm). If m is a small constant, exhaustive search may be computa-
tionally feasible, resulting in an exact algorithm (instead of a 3-approximation).
Remark 3.4. Budgeted-Additive Virtual Welfare Maximization can be solved ex-
actly in time poly(nm) by exhaustive search. Therefore, for all ǫ > 0, there is an
(ǫ, 1)-approximation algorithm for BMeD([n + 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE). Specifically, if ℓ
is the input length to an instance of BMeD([n + 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE), the algorithm
terminates in time poly(ℓ, nm, 1/ǫ) and succeeds with probability 1−exp(−poly(ℓ, 1/ǫ)).
Finally, we remark that the single-item case is especially simpler than even the two
item case. We refer the reader to [Cai et al. 2012, 2013] for complete details, but es-
sentially the sampling procedure that results in the ǫ error of Theorem 2.5 can be
replaced by an exact computation only in the single item case (and not even in the two
item case), and ǫ can be set to exactly 0.
Remark 3.5. Budgeted-Additive Virtual Welfare Maximization with m = 1 can
be solved exactly in time poly(n) by exhaustive search: there are only n possible
outcomes, corresponding to assigning the item to exactly one of the agents. There-
fore, there is a (0, 1)-approximation algorithm (i.e. an exact algorithm) for BMeD([n+
1],R2+,REVENUE) (i.e. the single item case). Specifically, if ℓ is the input length to an
instance of BMeD([n+1],R2+,REVENUE), the algorithm terminates in time poly(ℓ), and
succeeds with probability 1.
3.2. Structural Results
In this section, we discuss the structure of the optimal mechanism, and of the computa-
tionally efficient mechanism from Section 3.1. We begin by characterizing the optimal
mechanism by combining Theorem 2.6 with Observation 1.
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THEOREM 3.6. In any BMeD([n+1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE) instance, the optimal mech-
anism can be implemented as a distribution over virtual welfare maximizers. Specifi-
cally, there exists a distribution ∆ over mappings (f δ1 , . . . , f
δ
n). Each mapping f
δ
i maps
types (~vi, bi) ∈ R
m+1
+ to a multiplier m
δ
i (~vi, bi) ∈ R+ and a vector ~w
δ(~v, bi) ∈ R
m. Define
φδi to be the mapping that takes as input types (~vi, bi) ∈ R
m+1
+ and outputs a valuation
function φδi (~vi, bi)(·) with φ
δ
i (~vi, bi)(S) = m
δ
i (~vi, bi) · min{bi,
∑
j∈S vij} +
∑
j∈S w
δ
ij(~vi, bi).
The allocation rule of the optimal mechanism first samples (f δ1 , . . . , f
δ
n) from ∆, and
on profile (~v,~b), allocates the items according to argmaxS1⊔...⊔Sn⊆[m]{
∑
i φ
δ
i (~vi, bi)(Si)}.
Furthermore, if mδi (~vi, bi) > 0, bidder i is charged min{bi,
∑
j∈Si
vij}. If m
δ
i (~vi, bi) = 0,
then bidder i is charged 0.
PROOF. The proof starts with an application of Theorem 2.6 to the problem
BMeD([n + 1]m,Rm+1+ ,REVENUE). By Observation 1, the joint optimization over al-
locations x and price vectors ~p can be accomplished by transforming the optimization
into one that depends only on the allocation. Once the allocation is found, optimization
of the price vector follows as in Observation 1.
We remark that the virtual types involved in Theorem 3.6 have valuation functions
that are the sum of a budgeted-additive function, and an additive function (the latter
may have negative item values). We also note that the budgeted-additive component
depends in a very structured way on the input type (~vi, bi). Specifically, bi is turned into
a hard cap on the bidder’s maximum valuation instead of a hard budget on her ability
to pay, and the additive valuation ~vi is kept the same, forming a budgeted-additive
function that is scaled by a positive multiplier mi. The multiplier mi and additional
values ~wi may show little structure with respect to the input types (or perhaps none at
all).
We also remark that the structure is especially simple in the case of a single item, be-
cause a budgeted-additive function for a single item is just a typical valuation function
(where the bidder’s value for the item is the minimum of her value and her budget).
Specifically, the virtual type parameterized by mδi (vi, bi) and wi(vi, bi) values the item
at mimin{vi, bi}+ wi(vi, bi). This observation leads to the following simplification:
Remark 3.7. In any BMeD([n + 1],R2+,REVENUE) instance (i.e. the single item
case), the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a distribution over virtual value
maximizers. Specifically, there exists a distribution∆ over mappings (f δ1 , . . . , f
δ
n). Each
mapping f δi maps types (vi, bi) ∈ R
2
+ to an indicator bit m
δ
i (vi, bi) ∈ {0, 1} and a virtual
value φδi (vi, bi). The allocation rule of the optimal mechanism first samples (f
δ
1 , . . . , f
δ
n)
from ∆, and on profile (~v,~b), allocates the item to any bidder i∗ ∈ argmaxi{φ
δ
i (vi, bi)}
if her virtual value is non-negative, and doesn’t allocate the item otherwise. Further-
more, if mδi∗(vi∗ , bi∗) = 1, bidder i
∗ is charged min{bi∗ , vi∗}. If m
δ
i∗(vi∗ , bi∗) = 0, then
bidder i∗ is charged 0.
We conclude with a statement regarding the format of our computationally efficient
mechanisms from Section 3.1. This is an instantiation of Algorithm 2 in [Cai et al.
2013], which is used to prove Theorem 2.5.
THEOREM 3.8. The mechanism providing the guarantee of Theorem 3.3 has the
following format:
Phase One, Find the Mechanism:
(1) Write a linear program that optimizes revenue over the space of truthful, feasible
interim forms (Section 2.2).
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:15
(2) Pick an ǫ > 0. Using the algorithm developed in Section 3.1, and the reduction
of [Cai et al. 2013], solve this linear program approximately.
(3) This yields an interim form corresponding to a mechanism that is an (ǫ, 3)-
approximation.
(4) The linear program also outputs auxiliary information in the form of a distribution
∆ over mappings (f δ1 , . . . , f
δ
n) of the same format from Theorem 3.6.
Phase Two, Run the Mechanism:
(1) Sample a mapping from ∆ (provided in Phase One).
(2) On profile (~v, b), run the approximation algorithm of Section 3.1 for Budgeted-
Additive Virtual Welfare Maximization, with input budgets bi, input values vij , input
price multipliersmδi (~vi, bi), and input virtual values w
δ
ij(~vi, bi). Select this allocation.
(3) If mδi (~vi, bi) > 0, charge bidder i the minimum of their budget and their value for
the items they receive. Otherwise, charge them nothing.
Note that this mechanism has basically the same structure as the optimal mech-
anism, except that on every profile it only approximately maximizes virtual welfare
(and we also first have to find the mechanism, which is completely described by the
distribution ∆). In the special case of a single item, the structure can again be simpli-
fied.
Remark 3.9. In the special case of a single item, the following algorithm finds the
optimal mechanism in polynomial time:
Phase One, Find the Mechanism:
(1) Write a linear program that optimizes revenue over the space of truthful, feasible
interim forms (Section 2.2).
(2) Using the reduction of [Cai et al. 2013] and the observation in Remark 3.5 that
Budgeted-Additive Virtual Welfare Maximization with m = 1 can be solved exactly,
solve this linear program exactly. This yields an interim form corresponding to the
optimal mechanism.
(3) The linear program also outputs auxiliary information in the form of a distribution
∆ over mappings (f δ1 , . . . , f
δ
n) of the same format from Remark 3.7.
Phase Two, Run the Mechanism:
(1) Sample a mapping from ∆ (provided in Phase One).
(2) On profile (~v, b), award item j to any bidder i∗ ∈ argmaxi{φ
δ
i (vi, bi)} if her virtual
value is non-negative. Don’t allocate item j otherwise.
(3) If mδi (~vi, bi) = 1, charge bidder i the minimum of their budget and their value for
the items they receive. Otherwise, charge them nothing.
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